Marquette Law Review
Volume 101
Issue 3 Spring 2018

Article 5

Bringing the Science of Policing to Liability for ThirdParty Crime at Shopping Malls
Aaron D. Twerski
Jon M. Shane

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
Repository Citation
Aaron D. Twerski and Jon M. Shane, Bringing the Science of Policing to Liability for Third-Party Crime at Shopping Malls, 101 Marq. L.
Rev. 775 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol101/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

TWERSKI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/4/18 11:26 AM

BRINGING THE SCIENCE OF POLICING TO
LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIME AT
SHOPPING MALLS
AARON D. TWERSKI* & JON M. SHANE**
Unlike state and municipal police forces that can generally not be sued by
victims of crime on the grounds that they provided inadequate policing,
shopping malls are regularly the targets by crime victims in tort actions for
failing to provide adequate security. Courts have struggled with the question
of how to set the standard for reasonable policing. Most courts place heavy
emphasis on the foreseeability by the mall management of the likelihood of
criminal activity to take place on the grounds of the mall. In doing so, they rely
on the testimony of security experts who intuit as to the adequacy of the staffing.
This Article challenges the case law on several grounds. First, experts fail
to utilize objective data as to the workload of security officers on the mall. This
Article will demonstrate that such data is available and provides an objective
measure as to adequate staffing. Second, foreseeability of crime is too
uncertain a measure as to the adequacy of staffing. The question of how much
foreseeability is sufficient to trigger a duty of security has bedeviled the courts.
Third, courts have struggled to determine whether better security would have
avoided harm to a particular crime victim. Thus, even if security is found to be
inadequate it is often impossible for plaintiffs to prove causation. This Article
argues that once a court, based on objective data, sets the standard of
reasonable care, the burden of proof that additional security would not have
averted the crime to the victim should shift to the defendant management of the
mall.
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 776
II. THE LIABILITY STANDARD: FOUR VERSIONS OF DUTY .......................... 780
III. THE ILLUSIVE ISSUE OF ACTUAL OR BUT-FOR CAUSATION .................. 783
* Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Having completed
fifty years as a law professor I would like to dedicate this article to my mentors at Marquette Law
School, the late Professors James Ghiardi and Ray J. Aiken. They inspired me with their brilliance and
dedication to the law for which I am forever grateful. We want to acknowledge the valuable
contribution of David Gelfand, Brooklyn Law School, 2018, who served as research assistant on this
article.
** Jon M. Shane, Professor of Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice.

TWERSKI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

776

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 11:25 AM

[101:775

IV. STAFFING MODEL FOR SHOPPING CENTER SECURITY PERSONNEL ....... 786
A. Workload Data Evaluation ....................................................... 787
B. A Simulated Workload Analysis and Staffing Model for a
Shopping Center ...................................................................... 788
C. The Importance of Workload Analysis to Security Litigation ... 797
V. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN MALL SECURITY CASES TO THE
DEFENDANT .................................................................................... 799
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 801
I.

INTRODUCTION

Shopping malls and other public areas not policed by government occupy
a unique position with regard to policing against crime.1 Unlike the streets,
highways, and public thoroughfares that are policed by municipalities, counties,
or state agencies, general shopping malls are not under the aegis of public
authorities.2 Instead they are treated as purely private property with
responsibility for security against the commission of crime totally in the hands
of the management of the malls.3 The enormity of this undertaking can be
1. Though some shopping malls are in decline as a result of on-line shopping, other malls
continue to be profitable. See Ben Eisen, Retailer Woes Depress Mall REITS, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2017, at B10. However, malls that have lost their major tenants are now being redesigned to serve
multiple purposes such as schools, senior citizen homes, fitness centers, and micro-lofts. See, e.g.,
Kim Peterson, 10 New Uses for Abandoned Malls, MONEY WATCH (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/media/10-new-uses-for-abandoned-malls/ [https://perma.cc/J8SX-M5B5];
Amanda Erickson, 7 Uses for Failing Shopping Malls, CITY LAB (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/01/7-alternatives-failing-shopping-malls/4335
[https://perma.cc/F5RQ-2SEM]; see also Esther Fung, New Way to Fill Malls: Medical Centers, WALL
ST. J., June 19, 2017, at A3; Esther Fung, Mall of Future Will Have No Stores, WALL ST. J., June 13,
2017, at B6. The management of these redesigned malls will still have to grapple with the issue of
adequate security. Furthermore, the workload model set forth in this Article will apply to sports arenas,
parking lots that serve multiple car rental establishments, and other similar areas where management
is responsible for security rather than state or municipal police forces.
2. See, e.g., STEVEN W. MCNALLY, EXPLORING STRIP MALL CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN: A QUALITATIVE SINGLE CASE STUDY 36 (2015).
3. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 638 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter DOBBS ON
TORTS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The site, design and
type of each shopping center generally inform whether security is provided by the mall or through
public police and how much security is needed. For example, the vast majority of strip malls in the
United States do not provide security, relying instead on public police, but regional and super-regional
malls either have internal security personnel or contract with outside vendors for security. Telephone
Interview with Malachy Kavanagh, Senior Vice President, ICSC (Feb. 10, 2017); see also Ellen
Romano, Making Shopping Centers Safer, 59 J. PROP. MGMT. 46, 49 (1994) (discussing environmental
changes). In either case, security extends to the common areas of the malls—parking lots, parking
garages, ingress and egress areas, stairwells and interconnected corridors—but ends at the lease line,
where the tenant begins. Id. at 47. The malls do not provide security for the interior space of individual
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understood by observing the huge size of the malls and the number of visitors
to malls. The average size of the thirty largest malls in the United States is 2.07
million square feet of gross leasable area (GLA). 4 The average yearly
retail stores; that is the responsibility of each tenant. See, e.g., MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 87–89.
This Article is concerned with security staffing for work emanating from common areas of malls and
not with individual retail stores. The methodology can be generalized to any size or type of mall to
develop an understanding about staffing needs.
4. Annual visitor data were obtained from research conducted by Travel and Leisure. See Joe
Yogerst, America’s Most-Visited Shopping Malls, TRAVEL & LEISURE (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.travelandleisure.com/slideshows/americas-most-visited-shopping-malls
[https://perma.cc/424U-7HHQ]. Data on annual visitors are not collected by Shoppertrak, the
International Council of Shopping Centers, or the Directory of Major Malls, which are the mall
industry’s leading advocacy and professional groups. See id. As a matter of proprietary interest, most
malls either do not capture or do not publish data on annual visitors. See id. As such, all data on
visitors are estimates. Id. Given that the data are used for a simulated exercise, estimates are suitable.
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE STUDY (N=30)
Variables
n
%
Mean
Gross Leasable Area
(GLA)
Daily Visitors
Years Operating
Overall Attendance
Before 1971
After 1971
Attendance by State
NY
Northeast
CA
West
FL
South
IL
Midwest
TX
South
NJ
Northeast
AZ
West
GA
South
MA
Northeast
MI
Midwest
MN
Midwest
NC
South
NV
West
OH
Midwest
PA
Northeast
VA
South
WA
West
Attendance by Region

30
30
30
30
15
15
30
5
3
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
30

———100.0
50.0
50.0
100.0
16.7
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
6.7
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
100.0

2,070,000.0
56,843.6
39.4
19,270,000.0
16,913,333.3
21,626,666.7
—20,800,000.0
21,866,666.7
21,666,666.7
2,000,000.0
20,333,333.3
15,900,000.0
12,200,000.0
1,500,000.0
1,700,000.0
8,400,000.0
40,000,000.0
20,000,000.0
1,300,000.0
810,000.0
25,000,000.0
22,100,000.0
9,900,000.0
—-

S.D.
564,196.1
21,047.9
13.6
7,135,252.5
5,925,232.6
7,645,303.6
—2,280,350.9
5,801,149.3
9,291,573.2
8,888,194.4
4,041,451.9
5,798,275.6
————————————-
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attendance per mall is 19.27 million visitors.5 Based on being open for business
an average of 6.5 days per week, each year average daily attendance is 56,844.6
Suffice it to say that the amount of daily human traffic in a large shopping mall
is enormous—equal to that of many fairly large American cities.7
Comparing large shopping mall traffic with cities of like population would
be of little interest were it not for a vast difference in the law governing liability
to individuals who claim to have suffered personal injury as a result of
inadequate policing. With very limited exceptions, government entities are not
held liable to individuals against claims that the entity has not provided
adequate resources to prevent crime.8 Courts have found no tort duty running
to an individual.9 The very opposite is true with regard to shopping malls.10 A
multitude of claimants have sued in tort for the negligence of the management
of shopping malls for crimes perpetrated against individuals on their premises
based on the grounds that management failed to provide adequate security.11

Northeast
South
Midwest
West

9
9
6
6

30.0
30.0
20.0
20.0

19,755,555.6
20,344,444.4
19,416,666.7
16,783,333.3

3,948,136.0
5,503,887.5
12,900,607.2
6,745,788.8

5. See id.
6. See id.
7. For example, according to the 2015 Census Bureau estimate, Jupiter, Florida, had a population
of 62,748.
American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov
[https://perma.cc/Q4VP-UUR8] (last visited July 13, 2017). The 2016 estimates for La Mesa,
California, are 59,948. Id. The comparison between cities and shopping malls is not directly
analogous; however, shopping malls do compare well with cities in terms of calls for service, crime,
staffing issues and security needs. The size of the mall (density) and the amount of time someone
spends at the mall compared to a city create measurement issues. Nonetheless, the presence of over
56,000 people at a mall over a given day presents policing challenges similar to cities.
8. See DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 574; Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of
Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection From Crime, 90
A.L.R. 5th 273 (2001); see, e.g., Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882, 887–88 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying
Kansas Law); Mastbergen v. City of Sheldon, 515 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 1994); Riss v. City of New York,
240 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1968).
9. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887–88; Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860–61.
10. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 262 (Mo. 2002) (en banc);
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38, 40–41 (N.C. 1981).
11. See, e.g., Young v. Prizm Asset Mgmt. Co., 100 A.3d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014); Fenelon v.
Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc); Trammell Crow
Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008); American Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Hogue, 1998-CA01273-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d 247; Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d
83 (Tenn. 2000); Knauss v. DND Neffson Co., 963 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); McClung v. Delta
Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996); Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207
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Thus, the question of how much security is enough security to protect a mall
against personal injury claims based on negligence is a question of great
moment. We do not mean to say that the question of adequate policing for
municipal and state agencies is unimportant. A vast literature has sought to
grapple with that issue.12 At bottom, however, the resolution of that issue is
political. What resources are to be directed to police, firefighters, schools and
infrastructure are simply not justiciable by common law courts.13 For shopping
malls there is no escape from the question of the adequacy of security.
This Article will examine the law governing the liability of shopping malls
for negligence based on inadequate staffing. Part II will examine the four tests
utilized by courts to decide liability for torts against individuals and will find
them all seriously flawed. Part III will assume that negligence can be
established, but will focus on the requirement that a plaintiff establish that the
failure to provide adequate security was a cause-in-fact of her injury. Part IV
will demonstrate that the issue of how much security is adequate is subject to
objective quantification that is data-driven. Part V will argue that a plaintiff
who proves that based on objective data the mall has not provided adequate
security should not be required to prove a causal nexus between the inadequacy
(Cal. 1993); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Doe, 454 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Miles v.
Flor-Line Assocs., 442 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Foster, 281 S.E.2d 36.
12. See, e.g., CHARLES D. HALE, POLICE PATROL: OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT (2d ed.
1994); JON M. SHANE, WHAT EVERY CHIEF EXECUTIVE SHOULD KNOW: USING DATA TO MEASURE
POLICE PERFORMANCE (2007); THE TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, NW. U., POLICE ALLOCATION MANUAL :
DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL FOR PATROL SERVICES FOR
STATE
POLICE
DEPARTMENTS
(1993),
https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/12763
[https://perma.cc/5E76-YRSG]; Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects
of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995);
Jeremy M. Wilson & Alexander Weiss, A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and
Allocation, in ESSENTIALS FOR LEADERS (2012).
13. See, e.g., Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860–61. For example, in Riss v. City of New York, the court
said:
The amount of [police] protection that may be provided is limited by the resources
of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how
those resources may be deployed. For the courts to proclaim a new and general
duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular
seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably
determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated
and without predictable limits. This is quite different from the predictable
allocation of resources and liabilities when public hospitals, rapid transit systems,
or even highways are provided.
Before such extension of responsibilities should be dictated by the indirect
imposition of tort liabilities, there should be a legislative determination that that
should be the scope of public responsibility.
Id.
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of the security and her individual injury. Rather, the burden of proof should be
on the defendant to prove that even with adequate security the plaintiff would
have been injured.
II. THE LIABILITY STANDARD: FOUR VERSIONS OF DUTY
Courts traditionally begin their analysis of the duty of landowners to protect
against third-party crime by noting that duty is an issue of law to be decided by
the court.14 In doing so they signal that they are not prepared to simply allow
these cases to go to juries on a common law negligence standard.15 Instead they
seek to establish rules to screen out cases before they are permitted to go to a
jury.16 The four approaches to the problem are:
(1) Specific Imminent Harm Test. According to this rule a
landowner does not owe a duty to protect patrons from the
violent acts of third parties unless he is aware of specific
imminent harm about to befall them.17
(2) Similar Incidents Test. In order to establish foreseeability
requiring a mall to take precautions against third-party
crime the plaintiff must establish a past history of similar
criminal conduct on or near the premises.18
(3) Totality of Circumstances Test. This test looks to a host of
factors such as the nature, condition and location of the
land, the level of crime in the surrounding area and any
other factors that may alert the landowner to the likelihood

14. See, e.g., Trammell, 267 S.W.3d at 12; L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89;
Ann M., 863 P.2d at 212; Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
15. See, e.g., Trammell, 267 S.W.3d at 12; L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89;
Ann M., 863 P.2d at 212; Nola M., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101; Thai, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
16. For a summary of differing approaches, see DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 638–39.
Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222, p. 4–8 (La. 11/30/99); 752 So. 2d 762, 766–67; McClung,
937 S.W.2d at 899–900.
17. Willmon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1074, 1076–77 (E.D. Ark. 1997);
MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 33, 34, 40 (Mich. 2001); Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc.,
540 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Va. 2001); Burns v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Va. 1995); Bailey v. Bruno’s
Inc., 561 So. 2d 509, 510–11 (Ala. 1990); Naegele v. Dollen, 63 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Neb. 1954).
18. Wood v. Centermark Props., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), modified,
L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258; Lauersdorf v. Supermarket Gen. Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997); Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 940–41 (Ark. 1996).
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of crime.19
(4) The Balancing Test. This test seeks to address the interests
of both business proprietors and their customers by
balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden of
imposing a duty to protect against criminal acts of third
persons.20
The “specific imminent” harm test has been rejected by most courts as too
restrictive in limiting the duty of business owners to their invitees.21 The
“similar incidents test” has been criticized because of the variability of the
number and nature of crimes necessary to trigger a duty.22 The “totality of
circumstances” test has been shunned by some courts as being too open-ended
and hence imposing an overbroad duty to business establishments.23 The
“balancing test” appears not be a duty rule at all but simply an articulation of
the Learned Hand risk/utility test for negligence.24
Two related problems are common to each of these tests. First, they all rely
heavily on foreseeability of violent crime as the grounds either for imposing a
duty to adopt security measures or for deciding whether the standard they have
set was breached.25 However, the courts are hopelessly in disagreement as to
19. Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 899 P.2d 393, 400 (Haw. 1995); Whittaker v. Saraceno, 635
N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Mass. 1994); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Kan.
1993); Reitz v. May Co. Dept. Stores, 583 N.E.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
20. Various courts have adopted a balancing test that at first glance appears not to have the
hallmarks of duty rules that set firm guidelines for liability. Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 716 S.E.2d 910, 915
(S.C. 2011); Posecai, 99-1222, p. 8–9; 752 So. 2d at 767–68; McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901; Ann M.,
863 P.2d at 215. Nonetheless, these courts signal that they will engage in rigorous risk/utility balancing
and will not routinely allow cases to go to a jury without evidence of high foreseeability of crime. See
AARON D. TWERSKI ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 475–76 (3d ed. 2012).
21. Posecai, 99-C-1222, p. 6; 752 So. 2d at 767.
22. Id. at p. 6–7; 752 So. 2d at 767.
23. Id. at p. 7–8; 752 So. 2d at 767.
24. It is interesting to note that the California court that first articulated the “balancing test” in
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, concluded that it would not impose liability for failure to
hire security guards unless there was a “high degree of foreseeability” of criminal activity on the
premises and that degree of foreseeability “rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar
incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.” 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993). The court
said that “the obligation to provide patrols adequate to deter criminal conduct is not well defined. ‘No
one really knows why people commit crime, hence no one really knows what is “adequate” deterrence
in any given situation.’” Id. (quoting 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr.
528, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
25. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257–58 (Mo. 2002)
(en banc); Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 346 (Tex. App. 1999); Ann M., 863
P.2d at 215.
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how much foreseeable crime constitutes “enough foreseeability”26 to trigger a
duty of reasonable care or breach of the duty. Furthermore, in order to decide
whether mall management breached the standard of reasonable care the courts
rely on security experts to opine as to the adequacy of the security or breach
measures taken.27 As this Article will demonstrate, foreseeability of crime
should not be solely determinative of duty or breach of the standard of
reasonable care. Second, expert opinion is of little value if it does not utilize
hard data based on the total calls for service (i.e., assignments distributed to
security officers that require their presence to address a specific condition) that
sets forth the workload of security officers at the mall.28 The presence and
frequency of crime will be one of many variables that will appear in records of
calls for service.29 Security experts that are called by the opposing parties offer
little more than intuitive opinions as to the adequacy of security.30 We have
seen no evidence in the judicial opinions or the expert reports that workload
data has been referenced. Indeed, we have examined a multitude of shopping
mall security cases and expert opinions and have not found a single case where
an expert has testified to workload data.31
In the absence of hard data, the courts’ emphasis on similar incidents or
other indicia of crime are unhelpful in deciding the adequacy of security.
26. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)
(en banc) (stating plaintiff’s argument that an “atmosphere of violence” was sufficient to create duty
of reasonable care); Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 18 (Tex. 2008)
(Jefferson, J., concurring); Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 605 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998) (noting case law discussing how many crimes are sufficient to trigger a duty of reasonable care);
McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996) (“[C]ourts do not universally
agree on the meaning of ‘foreseeability.’”).
27. See, e.g., Fenelon, 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 7).
28. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶ 8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016).
29. Jon M. Shane, Activity-Based Budgeting: Creating a Nexus Between Workload and Costs,
74 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 11, 15 (2005).
30. See Wright, 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶ 8, 11).
31. See id. Because judicial decisions do not reflect workload data in deciding whether a mall
acted reasonably to secure the premises from third party criminal acts, we sought out expert reports
and affidavits to see whether expert reports made reference to workload data. After studying the
reports, we found not a single expert report that made reference to such data. We located these
documents by searching the Westlaw Database: Expert Reports and Affidavits, using the following
query: “Security/p park! or shop! And mall or center or retail and “premise! Liability.” The search
retrieved 386 results, which were filtered to display only those reports and affidavits from Law
Enforcement & Private Security Experts. The final result list contained 96 documents. The search
was last run on March 2, 2017, to determine whether the experts in their opinions utilized such data.
Experts that do not rely on workload data, or cannot articulate the methods or standards they relied
upon to arrive at their decision may be barred in some jurisdictions from testifying at trial. Id.
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Security officers deal not only with violent crime such as robbery, carjacking
and rape, but also a host of other activities in a mall such as auto accidents,
noise complaints, unruly juveniles, disorderly conduct, etc.32 Security officers
whose attention is diverted to a myriad of non-violent activities are not present
to adequately patrol and deter violent crime. Thus any test that a court adopts
to establish a duty to police against crime will fail unless the totality of service
calls for a mall is established. Admittedly, deployment of security forces, the
adequacy of their training, and whether they have adequate equipment will
factor into whether the mall’s security was reasonable, but the starting point has
to be adequacy of staffing. In the ensuing sections, we shall demonstrate that
such hard data on staffing is available but has never been used in shopping mall
injury cases.33
III. THE ILLUSIVE ISSUE OF ACTUAL OR BUT-FOR CAUSATION
Even where courts are able to make a finding of inadequate security,
plaintiffs are faced with an impossible causation burden to overcome. To make
out but-for causation, plaintiffs must establish that, had there been adequate
security, the crime would not have transpired.34 For reasons that will be
developed, plaintiffs either cannot meet the burden35 or the courts send the issue
to juries for resolution knowing that they can do nothing but speculate as to
whether causation has been established.36
For better or worse, the “but-for” test for causation is the overwhelming
majority rule as an essential element in making out a prima facie case of
negligence,37 and it has been formally recognized in the Third Restatement of
Torts.38 Though courts allow juries considerable latitude in deciding but-for

32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012);
Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
35. See, e.g., Fenelon, 11-CA-00683-COA (¶¶18, 24, 25) (Irving, J., dissenting); Saelzler v.
Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Cal. 2001); Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d
785, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Liller, 507 S.E. 2d at 606.
36. See Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 759 (Conn. 1995) (approving
general charge on causation without explicit reference to cause-in-fact).
37. DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 317.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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causation39 there are limitations.40 Pure speculation on causation is beyond the
pale. In landowner security cases, many courts have justifiably granted
defendants summary judgment or directed verdicts because the evidence on
causation was too thin.41 One might draw an analogy to the heeding
presumption that has been adopted by many courts in products liability failure
to warn cases42 to aid the plaintiff in mall security cases to establish causation.
When a plaintiff establishes that a product was sold with inadequate warnings
and that she suffered an injury that could have been averted had the warning
been given, the question arises whether plaintiff would have read or heeded the
warning had it been given.43 Courts are keenly aware that placing the burden
on the plaintiff may often result in no recovery.44 To aid the plaintiff in
39. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389–90 (2d Cir. 1998); Reynolds v.
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (La. 1885). The classic article on this topic is Wex S. Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 270 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
40. See, e.g., Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2006);
Perkins v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 147 So. 2d 646 (La. 1962).
41. See, e.g., Tucker v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 689 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1988); Fenelon v.
Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Burris v. Eddie’s
Liquor Store, No. B153671, 2002 WL 31521538 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2002); Saelzler v. Advanced
Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001); Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1998); Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Nola M. v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
42. See Tech. Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972).
43. See, e.g., id. The earliest case confronting this issue was Technical Chemical Company v.
Jacobs, where the court said:
It has been suggested that the law should supply the presumption that an adequate
warning would have been read. “Where warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded.” Such a presumption works
in favor of the manufacturer when an adequate warning is present. Where there
is no warning, as in this case, however, the presumption that the user would have
read an adequate warning works in favor of the plaintiff user. In other words, the
presumption is that Jacobs would have read an adequate warning. The
presumption, may, however, be rebutted if the manufacturer comes forward with
contrary evidence that the presumed fact did not exist. Depending upon the
individual facts, this may be accomplished by the manufacturer’s producing
evidence that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the use,
irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstance tending to show
that the improper use was or would have been made regardless of the warning.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. LAW INST .
1965)).
44. See Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exporters Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1998); Nissen
Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev’d on
other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
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establishing a prima facie case in products liability, a substantial number of
courts have created a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of
production to the defendant that the plaintiff would not have either read or
heeded the presumption.45 Similarly, where plaintiff has established that
security was inadequate one might suggest that a presumption of causation
inure to the plaintiff, thus shifting the burden of production to the defendant
that additional security would not have averted the crime.46
The analogy to product liability cases is not apt. In product failure-to-warn
cases, defendants seek to rebut the presumption by introducing evidence of the
plaintiff’s behavior that suggests that the plaintiff would not have heeded the
warning.47 Plaintiffs are then in a position to argue that the specific behavior is
not indicative that they would not have heeded a warning if given.48 The issue
is almost always one of fact subject to jury determination.49 In the mall security
cases, defendants will routinely present some evidence suggesting that
additional security would not have averted the particular crime.50 They will
have done enough to meet their burden of production. Plaintiffs, who retain the
burden of persuasion on causation, have no way of carrying their burden.51 It
is extremely difficult to prove that additional security guards would have
averted a criminal attack by a third party.52
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 278–79
(1990).
45. See, e.g., Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 1999); Nissen
Trampoline Co., 332 N.E.2d 820, 826–27, rev’d on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Reyes
v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Cunningham
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974). In 1998, the Third Circuit predicted that
Pennsylvania would adopt a heeding presumption in failure-to-warn cases. Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 883.
Although Pennsylvania’s high court has not yet decided this issue, the lower courts have adopted a
heeding presumption with increasing consistency. See, e.g., Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 A.3d
1203, 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (deciding that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury
on the heeding presumption in a case involving Children’s Motrin). For an extensive discussion of the
heeding presumption, also see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 44, at 278–80; Aaron D. Twerski &
Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation, 84
S. CAL. L. REV. 125, 136–43 (2010).
46. See Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 884.
47. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 162 F. App’x 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2006);
Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
48. See Bryant v. BGHA, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1395–96 (M.D. Ga. 2014).
49. Golonka, 65 P.3d at 966.
50. See, e.g., Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998);
Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
51. See Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2001).
52. See id. Some courts have switched the burden of proof on causation from the plaintiff to the
defendant when plaintiff faces an impossible burden of proof that the defendant’s negligence was the
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In the concluding section of this Article, we shall argue that the plaintiff not
be burdened with proving causation, but the burden of proof on causation
should shift to the defendant. We will be comfortable in doing so because we
will establish a data-driven standard for adequate security. Unlike the current
situation where the standard for what constitutes adequate security has no
objective parameters, causation has to serve as a break against wholly illusory
standards of liability.53 However, once a court can conclude with confidence
that objective data support a finding of inadequate security, there is every
reason to allow a plaintiff to recover without asking her to prove the impossible.
The burden of proof should shift to the defendants to prove that even with
adequate security the plaintiff would have suffered injury.
IV. STAFFING MODEL FOR SHOPPING CENTER SECURITY PERSONNEL
The need for security personnel at shopping centers is evident, but the
provocative question is this: How many security personnel are deemed
adequate or how much security is reasonable? To answer this question, it is
crucial to determine the actual and anticipated workload that shopping center
security personnel are likely to encounter based on calls for service. This
requirement for the shopping center can be anticipated; it is measurable. For
shopping center security, as with the public policing, the demand for services
shifts with priorities as well as the routine patterns and fluctuations of reactive
work that presents itself through calls for service.
A shopping center is akin to a city with all of the associated variation in
patrons (adults, juveniles, elderly) and temporal use patterns (day and time of
week, seasonality, holidays, special events, heavy-volume periods of vehicles
and pedestrians).54 In their decisions, courts often speak in generalized terms
when describing a shopping center’s level of security such as (in)adequate
staffing, (in)adequate security, (in)adequate safety measures, (un)reasonable
security, and (in)sufficient security.55 As noted, the parties rely on experts to
help determine what adequate staffing levels should have been at the time of
cause-in-fact of her injury. See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 475 (Cal. 1970); Summers
v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). But see, David W.
Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1783 (1997) (noting that Haft
fails to “offer much guidance as to when burden shifting is appropriate”).
53. See Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Noble v. L.A.
Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
54. See MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 2.
55. See Monk v. Temple George Assocs., L.L.C., 869 A.2d 179, 183, 187 (Conn. 2005); Noble,
214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
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the crime.56 Experts will often review crime statistics for the area surrounding
the mall, review the parking lot configuration, and review existing lighting, but
these conditions do not necessarily imply the need for a specific number of
security staff, particularly how many more personnel are needed to establish
“adequacy.”57 Moreover, these factors are not measured against any industry
standard that imply a need for additional security staff.58 Indeed, any standard
appears to be the personal estimate of the individual security experts who
inevitably disagree.59 At best, experts can only speculate about adequate
security levels when they are not informed by data; at worst, their estimates are
completely inaccurate about the number of personnel needed to provide
adequate security. While regional, corporate, and consumer preferences must
be accounted for when determining the appropriate level of security for a given
shopping center, there is a standardized method to establish a baseline measure
for adequate staffing using empirical data.60
A. Workload Data Evaluation
Shopping center security personnel typically engage in patrol activities
including emergency response, visitor management, patron assistance, escorts,
bank deposits, and traffic assistance.61 One of the most consistent activities
across different sized malls and regions is patrol and response.62 Determining
adequate patrol and response requires that the expert evaluate the reactive

56. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012);
Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
57. Monk, 869 A.2d at 183; Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
58. See generally Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 397–99.
59. Id. at 398.
60. See generally Shane, supra note 29 (explaining the full model and technical specifications
of how the model is conceptualized). Based on Shane’s personal and consultative experience in
policing since 1985 across the United States and abroad, capturing the workload data shown in Table
2 is a fundamental aspect of police management. See infra Table 2. Workload analysis is so basic to
policing that the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) recognizes
workload assessments as a standard that must be adopted for accreditation. See COMM’N ON
ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENF’T AGENCIES, INC., STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
16-2 (5th ed. 2006) (“The agency allocates personnel to, and distributes them within, all organizational
components in accordance with documented workload assessments conducted at least once every three
years.”). The Lee County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office has adopted Shane’s staffing model at the
recommendation of CALEA. Telephone Interview with Ronald Curtis, Captain, Florida Sheriff’s
Office (Mar. 9, 2017).
61. Romano, supra note 3, at 46–52; Margaret Hunter, Who’s Minding the Mall, 32 SEC. MGMT.
54, 54–56 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 3, at 46–47; Hunter, supra note 61, at 54.
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workload presented to the security department (i.e., calls for service).63
Workload data are objective.64 They present telltale signs of problems and the
locations where those problems are likely to emerge.65 The nexus between
workload and cost provides mall executives and managers the ability to exercise
control in several ways: (1) assign personnel based upon a demonstrated need;
(2) expand or contract personnel proportionately as the need changes; (3)
uncover waste and hidden costs; (4) view which activities are most and least
expensive, thus subjecting them to review; (5) assess the full efficiency of the
security program; (6) identify places to cut spending; (7) establish a cost
baseline that may be influenced through process or technology changes that
reduce effort requirements for the activity, and (8) argue from an informed,
objective position in favor of the security program’s budget.66
B. A Simulated Workload Analysis and Staffing Model for a Shopping Center
Collecting the Data. Security staffing based on empirical data is the most
reasonable and easiest to justify; in fact, “[t]he only logical and defensible
means of determining how many persons should be assigned to patrol duty is
through a careful and systematic analysis of the duties performed by patrol
officers.”67 The best indicator of crime and disorder conditions, as well as
assigned duties, is analyzing actual calls for service of past demands.68 These
calls include crimes (violent and property); public disorder (noise, fighting,
groups congregating and loitering) and suspicious circumstances (persons,
vehicles and items) that belie security problems; as well as service needs such

63. Shane, supra note 29, at 15.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Generally, the focus on mall security is to assist and prevent crimes against patrons.
However, crimes against employees provide telltale signs of a wider or emerging crime problem that
may not yet have reached patrons. Crimes involving employees such as assault, robbery, car theft, and
theft from cars should be viewed as indicators of a wider or emerging crime problem that should be
addressed.
66. Shane, supra note 29, at 12.
67. CHARLES D. HALE, POLICE PATROL: OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 162 (1981).
68. Richard C. Lumb, Community Attitudes Regarding Police Responsibility for Crime Control,
69 POLICE J. 319, 319–26 (1996) (discussing staffing indicators that are derived from demands for
service); see Shane, supra note 29, at 15 (describing the accuracy of calls for service data). Calls for
service data must not be confused with demographic data as a driver for security measures.
Demographic data are variables such as age, sex, race, employment status, poverty level, income level,
education level, and population characteristics. These are not crime data; they are data that reflect the
composition of the population collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. Demographic data do not
implicate site-specific conditions, actual crime rate or workload volume at a given property address
and should not be relied upon to infer crime and disorder conditions.
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as medical calls, hazardous conditions, traffic control, and patron assistance.69
Determining adequate staffing begins with a workload analysis, which is “the
process of collecting and analyzing data on patrol activities for the purpose of
more efficient scheduling and deployment of manpower.”70 Calls for service
represent the reactive portion of the workload.71 Undertaking this process is
required to determine how well the mall security program is implemented.72 To
say that staffing is adequate based on intuition without hard data is not a rational
process. Rational in this sense is aimed at measuring aspects of the mall’s
business process to determining whether management acted reasonably.73 It is
important to have at least one full year’s worth of data in order to account for
seasonal fluctuations or other random anomalies that might occur (e.g., spike
or sudden decrease in calls for service).74 A better data set is three to five years
that also accounts for personnel trends such as fluctuations in staffing levels or
significant emergencies that may adversely impact how calls for service are
handled including the amount of time required to handle individual calls.75 A
larger data set is also crucial to ensure a sufficient number of calls can be
examined for their regularity (frequency and location) and similarity (type and

69. See infra Table 2 and accompanying text.
70. HALE, supra note 67, at 163. Other staffing methods such as the per capita, minimum
staffing and the authorized level approaches exist, but all are severely limited and do not account for
workload volume. The workload approach is much more comprehensive in determining appropriate
staffing levels and is endorsed by the Commission for the Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies. COMM’N, supra note 60, at 16-2; see ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION
AND DEPLOYMENT 32–45 (2009) (describing “early” and “modern” police allocation strategies); see
also JEREMY M. WILSON & ALEXANDER WEISS, A PERFORMANCE-BASED APPROACH TO POLICE
STAFFING
AND
ALLOCATION
21–50
(2012),
http://acapp.msu.edu/sites/default/files/files/041218461_Performance_Based_Approach_Police_Staffing_FI
NAL100112.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88C-6Y76] (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
71. WILSON & WEISS, supra note 70, at 36.
72. It is possible that workload data may be manipulated to show lesser need for security.
However, mall management needs this data to self-monitor and it is not likely that workload data will
be falsified.
73. SECURITY SUPERVISION & MANAGEMENT 428 (Sandi J. Davies & Christopher A. Hertig
eds., 3d ed. 2008) (documenting calls for service as “factual evidence of what is transpiring at the
site . . . as opposed to what people ‘think’ is happening”). See generally PETER M. BLAU & RICHARD
A. SCHOENHERR, THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS (1971); JAMES D. THOMPSON,
ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967).
74. Shane, supra note 29, at 15.
75. See id. (“A better data set would encompass 2 years of information to clarify these same
variables and also to illuminate personnel trends.”).
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severity), which helps identify patterns and trends for planning purposes76 and
may explain how offenders find suitable targets.77
The workload analysis begins with defining the principle modalities (Table
2)78 and must include: (1) type of call; (2) average number of hours spent
handling the call;79 (3) number of calls of each type; (4) number of personnel
required to handle the call; and (5) total employee hours per modality (Table
3).80 The hours per unit is the average amount of time spent handling a single
call for service of that type (e.g., handling a single assault will take 1 hour).81
The units per year is the total number of calls for service for that type (e.g.,
there were twenty-five assaults for the year). 82 The officers required is the
number of officers assigned to handle each call.83 The total employee hours per
modality is the product of hours per unit × units per year × officers required.84
This presents the baseline volume of service demands and hours that security
personnel will encounter as a matter of reactive work.85 This type of data is
routinely captured by mall security either through pen and paper records, or
electronically through computer-aided dispatch calls for service.86
Although Table 2 is based on a yearly workload, this information can be
retrieved by the month, week, or day in the calendar year.
76. Id. Calls for service data—which include date, time, location, duration, and nature—will put
mall management on notice about people, places, and things that are prone to victimization. Premises
liability litigation may focus on a specific location within the property (such as a particular area of the
parking lot, or a common area inside the mall) and may allege inadequate security based on a design
flaw, a mechanical defect in a security device, or inadequate security staffing, which is why date, time,
location, duration, and nature are vitally important variables to capture; these data alert mall
management to emerging problems. Calls for service may also fluctuate based on temporal distribution
such as time of day, day of week, month of year and season (e.g., Christmas or holiday shopping). See
HALE, supra note 12, at 231. In general, private security will often know about specific incidents and
the wider patterns that develop from those incidents that occur on their property before the public
police. This is why it behooves mall management to frequently analyze workload data and to adjust
existing personnel as necessary or hire additional personnel. See MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 36.
77. See generally Patricia L. Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, Environment, Routine, and
Situation: Toward a Pattern Theory of Crime, in 5 ROUTINE ACTIVITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE :
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY (Ronald V. Clarke & Marcus Felson eds., 1993).
78. “Modalities” are the attributes (i.e., major activities) that are being examined. In this
example, the attributes are the types of calls for service mall security is likely to handle.
79. Any portion of an hour is calculated as such. For example, 20 minutes is captured as .33
hours; 47 minutes is captured as .783 hours.
80. Shane, supra note 29, at 15–16.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 15.
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Distributing Officers’ Time Across Management Categories. After the
baseline calculations are determined for the reactive workload it is necessary to
distribute the time across three primary categories: (1) service demands; (2)
administrative activities; and (3) proactive activities87 (Table 3). The first
category (service demands) is critical since the other categories receive their
allotted time based on what is allotted in this category. The first priority for
mall security is to answer calls for service from patrons and tenants.88 The sum
of employee hours per modality represents 100% of the reactive workload
(8,097 hours in this simulation, Table 1).89 However, there are other activities
security personnel must do besides respond to calls for service, such as
administrative tasks (e.g., submitting reports, attending meetings, meeting with
supervisors) and proactive activities.90 It is not realistic to formulate a staffing
model around 100% of the total employee hours per modality without
accounting for a security officer’s other responsibilities. This is where
decisions about corporate priorities must be made regarding how much of the
officers’ time mall management is willing to distribute across these three
categories. Administrative time and proactive time are discretionary but must
be derived from a rational process. Administrative time allocation (e.g.,
meeting with supervisors, submitting reports, attending meetings) should be
based on meeting or supervisor logs.
Proactive time is the most important discretionary area of mall management
decision-making. It includes decisions as to how many stationary guards
should be assigned at fixed places (entrances, exits, bridges); how many CCTV
cameras should be installed and the number of personnel to monitor them; and
the number of roving patrol cars or foot patrol persons to be assigned.91 These
decisions are informed in part by the reactive workload that provides
information as to potential areas where trouble may be expected.92 However,
deterrence is integral to effective policing and visible security is as important
to mall security as it is to policing in municipalities, highways, and other public

87. Id. at 17. Proactive activities consist of self-initiated work (e.g., stop & question, traffic
stops, parking enforcement, meeting with business owners, assisting patrons, surveillance) aimed at
deterring crime and disorder through a visible show of security presence and engaging patrons to learn
their concerns, thereby preventing crime from occurring. See id. This is contrasted against reactive
activities such as responding to calls for service after something has occurred. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 16.
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areas. 93 Proactive patrol is also used for observing suspicious circumstances,
disrupting emerging disorder conditions (congregating juveniles), assisting
patrons, addressing traffic conditions, and checking vulnerable locations (e.g.,
places where non-violent crime such as burglary, theft, and vandalism may
occur).94 Consumer attitudes toward safety should also be taken into account.95
The fact that this is a discretionary area of decision-making does not mean that
it is without rigor. Just as police document their decisions as to the deployment
of resources, mall security mangers must be able to explain the processes they
utilized for deciding both the number of security personnel and their
deployment.
In the following simulation, to handle 23,135 hours of work, where 35% of
time is allocated to service demands, 10% is allocated for administrative
activities, and 55% is allocated to proactive activities, the effective strength is
eleven security officers (Table 3).96
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME
Activity
%
Hours/year
Service Demands
35.00%
8,097
Administrative
10.00%
2,314
Proactive
55.00%
12,724
Total
100.00%
23,135
Scheduled Hours
2,086
Effective Strength
11.09
The relief factor (Table 4), also known as nonproductive FTE, accounts for
officers’ time off for various reasons (e.g., vacation, bereavement leave,
personal day off, sick leave, training) and is used as a multiplier to determine
coverage needs. Once the relief factor is calculated, the actual personnel
strength can be calculated, which is the actual number of security personnel
required to handle the workload based on the distribution of time. To provide

93. See Romano, supra note 3, at 46–47; see also Marcus Felson, Those Who Discourage Crime,
in 4 CRIME AND PLACE: CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 62 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995).
94. See generally Romano, supra note 3.
95. The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) conducts an annual customer survey
on behalf of shopping centers to document consumers’ preferences, perceptions, and satisfaction,
including security features, so that mall tenants and security directors can adjust their practices.
Telephone Interview with Malachy Kavanagh, Senior Vice President, ICSC (Feb. 10, 2017).
96. By way of example using this same data, if service demands are allocated at 65%,
administrative activities at 10%, and proactive activities at 25%, total hours of work is reduced to
12,457 (-46.1% reduction) with an effective strength of six security personnel instead of eleven.
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adequate coverage, 1.34 security officers are required for every position subject
to relief (Table 4).
TABLE 4: NONPRODUCTIVE FTE (RELIEF FACTOR)
Time Off in Hours
Time Off
Security Officer
Vacation
200
Compensatory
40
Sick Leave
120
Personal
24
Training
64
Bereavement
80
Total Time Off
528
Work Year Personnel
2,086
Availability
1,558
Relief Factor
1.34
Management and Support Staff Positions. In addition to the workload
analysis, other positions must be accounted for, including supervisors,
management, support staff and fixed-posts to get the full picture of security
staffing needs (Table 5).
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Actual Staffing Strength. In this simulation, 42 actual security officers are
required to handle 23,135 hours of work that is spread across sixteen hours per
day, seven days per week, for an entire year with an average attendance of
56,844 visitors (Table 6). Those personnel are supported by 6 supervisors, 3
CCTV operators and 3 parking lot attendants for a total of 54 officers. With
55% of the security officers’ time devoted to proactive activities, visible
presence is greatly heightened, which creates feelings of safety for patrons and
promotes more opportunities for officers to observe and report suspicious
circumstances, or engage with suspicious people.97
97. Observing and reporting suspicious circumstances are part of the “See Something, Say
Something” campaign of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the “Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative” of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, If You See Something, Say Something, https://www.dhs.gov/see-somethingsay-something [https://perma.cc/63HZ-7GZH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018); NATIONWIDE SAR
INITIATIVE, https://nsi.ncirc.gov/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6EW-HLF7] (last visited Jan. 28,
2018); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREPAREDNESS OF LARGE RETAIL
MALLS TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACK (2006). In this study of mall preparedness,
14.7% of mall security directors surveyed indicated that increasing the visibility of security officers
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C. The Importance of Workload Analysis to Security Litigation
In litigating a case where the issue is the adequacy of security, a workload
analysis is a crucial component in deciding whether the mall management was
negligent. First, it sets a baseline for how many security officers should have
been on duty to handle reactive calls based on past history. A mall that is
understaffed based on historical demands is presumably negligent.98 If the mall
has a reduced security presence it must be able to explain why it has not
provided adequate security to respond to expected calls for service. Second, if
the mall has not allocated resources for administrative personnel or for relief
time, it will either be poorly managed or understaffed, or both. Third, a
workload analysis informs the mall management as to hot spots to which they
was a measure that malls could take to become better prepared for a terrorist attack, id. at 10, and 63%
of security directors said that the most frequent security change following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks was “to increase the visibility of security officers, instruct officers to be alert for
suspicious individuals, and pay more attention to cars and delivery trucks coming into the mall.” Id.
at 18; see id. at 19 (illustrating the survey results). The study suggests that mall directors do focus on
visible patrols to deter crime and terror attacks. See id. at 27–28, 30.
98. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 2002) (en banc);
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981).
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should deploy security officers. Fourth, and most important, no policy or
security force can operate effectively without personnel devoted to a pro-active
presence to act as a deterrent against crime. If all that a mall covers is reactive
calls for service, it has not provided for roaming patrol cars, stationary officers
at fixed points in the mall, officers to monitor ingress and egress, or officers to
monitor surveillance cameras. We do not suggest that a workload analysis will
provide a definite answer as to the adequacy of security, but by setting forth a
baseline tied to calls for service it provides a firm starting point to begin the
analysis. Mall operators must then be able to defend how they account for
administrative needs and proactive policing.
Earlier we noted that foreseeability of crime has been the most important
factor relied on by the courts to establish a duty to provide security to protect
against third-party crime or the breach of that duty.99 Having set forth the need
for workload data to determine adequate staffing, we conclude that courts
simply have it wrong. The presence or absence of crime is reflected in calls for
service that in turn sets the basis for adequate security. When courts turn to
foreseeability to account for possible crime because a mall is located in a highcrime area, the premise is that crime in malls is more likely to occur because of
the proximity of criminals to the mall,100 but that premise fails to take into
account that malls may be structured in a manner to discourage third-party
crime. An entire science devoted to building malls and other structures to
minimize crime belies the emphasis on the location of malls as an important
determinant of the frequency of crime.101 Crime statistics of the surrounding
99. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Burris v. Eddie’s Liquor Store, No. B153671, 2002 WL 31521538 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 14, 2002); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 904 (Tenn. 1996); Sharon P.
v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 123–24 (Cal. 1999); Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 2008); Young v. Prizm Asset Mgmt. Co., 100 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014);
Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex. 1999); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc.,
856 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Kan. 1993); Holland v. Liedel, 494 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
101. See generally Patricia L. Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, Notes on the Geometry of
Crime, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L. Brantingham eds.,
1981). Environmental criminology is the study of crime, criminality, and victimization as each relates
to specific places and the way people and places shape activities in time and space to create or
discourage opportunities. See id. at 27–54; see also Patricia Brantingham & Paul Brantingham,
Criminality of Place: Crime Generators and Crime Attractors, 3 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 5–8
(1995); Felson, supra note 93; Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle, Environmental Criminology
and Crime Analysis: Situating the Theory, Analytic Approach and Application, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME ANALYSIS 1–3 (Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle eds., 2008).
Environmental criminology has its roots in urban planning and crime prevention; the theory suggests
that the physical environment, particularly its physical characteristics, building layout, and site plan
function to allow people to become key agents of security to defend the space. See generally OSCAR
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area do not necessarily imply that a crime is foreseeable on the shopping
center’s grounds. To accept this as a viable method of forecasting crime at the
shopping center is to deny virtually all of the environmental crime prevention
literature. Crime prevention through environment design, the concept of
defensible space and situational crime prevention exist so that facilities can be
made safer despite crime in surrounding areas.102 This is why facilities that are
designed with crime prevention in mind can be placed into risky neighborhoods
with reasonable assurance that crimes occurring outside the facility will not
necessarily occur inside the facility or on the facility’s grounds.103 It is an
either/or proposition. If over a significant period of time calls for service do
not reflect crime, then staffing may be adequate; if it does not then the great
likelihood is that the mall was constructed environmentally to discourage
crime.104
V. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN MALL SECURITY CASES TO THE
DEFENDANT
In an earlier section, we set forth the argument that in the context of datadriven standards for reasonable staffing, the failure to meet that standard is good
reason to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.105 Now that we have set
forth the model for deciding adequate staffing we need to revisit the argument.
In some cases, it is clear that the negligence of the mall to provide adequate
staffing will not be the cause of the plaintiff’s harm. If a patron of the mall
utilizes a hidden handgun to randomly shoot ten people in a minute’s time it is
likely that plaintiff will not be able to establish but-for causation or proximate

NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: PEOPLE AND DESIGN IN THE VIOLENT CITY (1972); Douglas D.
Perkins et al., The Physical Environment of Street Crime: Defensible Space, Territoriality and
Incivilities, 13 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 29 (1993). An integral part of environmental criminology is crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), which emphasizes a collection of design
principles for the “built” environment, both indoors and outdoors. C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIME
PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 224 (1977); MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 1, 3;
Corey L. Gordon & William Brill, The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design in Premises Liability, NAT’L INST. JUST. (1996) (discussing the evolution of the legal basis for
premises liability cases and their connection to CPTED features). These principles encourage users of
the physical environment to feel safe in their surroundings while concurrently discouraging motivated
offenders from engaging in crime and anti-social behavior. See Hunter, supra note 61, at 55–57;
Romano, supra note 3, at 46–51.
102. See Perkins, supra note 101, at 30.
103. Id.; Gordon & Brill, supra note 101, at 6; MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 1.
104. See Perkins, supra note 101, at 30–31.
105. See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text.
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cause.106 There is no necessity in such a case to shift the burden of proof.
Plaintiff will simply not be able to establish a prima facie case.
The more difficult cases for causation arise from mugging, carjacking,
kidnapping and various forms of sexual assault. One has sympathy for courts
that have struggled with the causation issue and their willingness to grant the
defendants summary judgment or directed verdicts.107 After all, how are we to
know that additional guards would have made a difference? As the California
Court of Appeal said in Nola M. v. University of Southern California in
discussing the causation issue, “[W]here do we draw the line? How many
guards are enough? Ten? Twenty? Two Hundred?”108 Lying beneath the
surface is the frustration courts have in determining the standard for adequate
security. If the standard of care rests on shaky foundations based almost
entirely on an unquantifiable foreseeability analysis and intuitive expert
opinion, it is understandable that courts would be reluctant to allow a plaintiff
to make a case based on both questionable negligence and equally questionable
causation.109
However, if the plaintiff can establish that mall security was inadequate
based on calls for service data, then placing the burden of proof of causation on
defendants is fair. A jury can determine with some confidence how much
security was necessary. The defendant should justly bear the burden of proving
that had that level of security been in place, the injury to the plaintiff would
have taken place in any event. The argument in favor of switching the burden
of proof on causation to the defendant in cases where the plaintiff proves breach
of the duty to provide adequate security was propounded by an intermediate
court of appeals in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400.110 On appeal, the
California Supreme Court rejected this position and found that the plaintiff had
not proved causation by a preponderance of the evidence.111 In finding the lack
of causation as a matter of law, the court relied on a line of cases that insisted
106. See, e.g., Lopez v. McDonald’s, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
107. See cases cited supra note 41.
108. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
109. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016) (explaining the relationship between the strength of the violation and the standard of care and
cause-in-fact). In Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse University, Judge Calabresi found that a
standard of care that just passes the threshold to avoid summary judgment will require more demanding
proof for cause-in-fact. 453 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
110. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). For a lengthy article supporting this position
see Dennis T. Yokoyama, The Law of Causation in Actions Involving Third-Party Assaults When the
Landowner Negligently Fails to Hire Security Guards: A Critical Examination of Saelzler v. Advanced
Group 400, 40 CAL.W. L. REV. 79 (2003).
111. Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001).
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that in security cases plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to make out
cause-in-fact.112 In our view, the reason why the court has taken a strong
position on the causation issue is clear. Where the standards for establishing
how much security would be reasonable security are tenuous, the courts will
not allow a burden shift to the defendants.113 Those who advocate a burden
shift to the defendants are willing to do so based on a simple breach of the
standard of care, i.e., there should have been more security guards.114 Since
they cannot quantify how many, they invite the courts to take the position that
they will not speculate on causation and thus deny recovery by refusing to let
the case go to juries.115
VI. CONCLUSION
The case law dealing with the liability of malls for third-party crime
committed on their premises has focused almost exclusively on the
foreseeability that crime may occur.116 The number of crimes that have
occurred in the past determine whether there is a duty or the breach of the
standard of care.117 Courts cannot agree as to the number or the severity of the
crimes necessary to trigger a duty of care or the breach.118 Experts for the
opposing parties regularly opine as to whether the staffing was adequate and
whether adequate staffing would have averted the crime to the plaintiff.119
This Article challenges the existing case law on two grounds. First,
adequate staffing of a mall cannot be determined by looking merely at past
criminal conduct. To determine adequate or reasonable staffing, it is absolutely
necessary to examine workload data to determine calls for service at the mall.
Second, the opinions of experts who opine as to adequate staffing without
undertaking a workload analysis are simply unprofessional. A workload
analysis is fundamental to all policing and is so recognized by the agency that
accredits police forces. Once a workload analysis is performed that identifies
the reactive work of the mall security force, it is necessary for the mall
management to decide the nature and the amount of proactive resources that it
112. Id. at 1149–51.
113. See id. at 1151–55.
114. See id. at 1154–55.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W. 3d 247, 258 (Mo. 2002) (en
banc); Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 345–46 (Tex. App. 1999); Ann M. v.
Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
117. See Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
118. See McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996).
119. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App.
2016); Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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needs to deploy for adequate security. Mall safety is too important to leave to
the untutored opinion of experts who have not done their basic homework. It
is high time that the science of policing be reflected in the judicial decisions
that decide cases based on mall injuries resulting from third-party crime.
Once the standard for adequate or reasonable policing of malls is
established, courts should shift the burden of proof to the defendant that the
lack of adequate policing was not causal. Plaintiff cannot prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that additional security would have prevented a
particular crime. If courts allow the causation question to go juries based on
expert testimony by plaintiffs that additional security would have prevented a
crime, they make a mockery of the causation issue. Plaintiffs cannot reasonably
carry their burden of proof. It may be difficult for defendants to prove that
additional security would not have made a difference, but if an error is to be
made it should be made against the defendants who failed, based on objective
criteria, to provide adequate security.

